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AbstractWe study the evolution of trading strategies in double auctions as the size
of the market gets larger. When the number of buyers and sellers is balanced, Fano
et al. [2] show that the choice of the order-clearing rule (simultaneous or asyn-
chronous) steers the emergence of fundamentally different strategic behavior. We
extend their work to unbalanced markets, confirming their main result as well as
that allocative inefficiency tends to zero. On the other hand, we discover that con-
vergence to the competitive outcome takes place only when the market is large and
that the long side of the market is more effective at improving its disadvantaged
terms of trade under asynchronous order-clearing.
1 Introduction
Recently, Fano et al. [2] have studied the evolution of trading strategies for a double
auction when the number of traders increases. They provide two main results. First,
the competitive outcome obtains under different market architectures, provided that
the size of the market is sufficiently large. Second, the choice of the order-clearing
rule affects trading behavior. Under simultaneous order-clearing, marginal traders
learn to act as price takers and make offers equal to their valuations or costs. Under
asynchronous order-clearing, the intramarginal traders learn to act as price makers
and make offers equal to the competitive price.
An important feature of their study is the assumption that buyers and sellers
populate the market in equal numbers; that is, the market is balanced. Moreover,
using a simulative approach, agents’ learning is modeled by means of a genetic
algorithm. Curiously enough, although it is well known that “traders on the long
side of a market wind up holding the short end of the stick” [8], the agent-based
literature has paid scant attention to the study of unbalanced markets; however, see
Gode and Sunder [5] or Anufriev et al. [1] for the special case of one seller, one
intramarginal buyer and n extramarginal buyers.
This paper explores what happens in double auctions when we remove the as-
sumption that the market is balanced. A second methodological contribution is that
we model agents’ learning by means of genetic programming, extending the reach
of genetic algorithms. We confirm and extend the main results in Fano et al. [2]
when the market is balanced.
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More importantly, we discover two novel effects when the market is unbalanced.
Under simultaneous order-clearing, the convergence towards price-taking behavior
expands from the marginal traders to the intramarginal traders on the long side,
due to the competitive pressure. A second result is about the interaction of strategic
behavior and order-clearing rule. When traders are forced to act as price takers,
the disadvantageous terms of trade for the long side are worse under asynchronous
order-clearing because the price is not uniform across all transactions. However,
when we let traders optimize their strategies for the protocol in use, asynchronous
order-clearing improves the average transaction price for the long side. In short, by
forcing a uniform price over all transaction, simultaneous order-clearing dampens
the effects due to strategic behavior.
2 The Model
There are n = b+ s traders, where b are buyers and s are sellers. Each trader wishes
to maximize expected profits and is in the market to exchange at most one unit of a
generic good per round. Each buyer i has a private valuation v i and each seller j has a
private cost c j. Valuations and costs are drawn from two stochastically independent
uniform distributions on [0,1]. Profits are v− p for buyers and p− c for sellers,
where p is the price at which a transaction occurs.
We speak of intramarginal and extramarginal buyers (sellers) according to their
position on the demand (supply) functionwith respect to themarket-clearing price(s).
We refine this qualitative distinction into a complete ordering, by defining the
strength of a buyer with valuation v as the distance from the valuation of the weak-
est buyer (v = 0) and the strength of a seller with cost c as the distance from the
valuation of the weakest seller (c = 1). Hence, stronger intramarginal traders have
valuations (or costs) lying farther away from the market-clearing price(s).
Agents trade using one of two distinct trading protocols, whose main difference
is in the nature of the order-clearing rule. Under simultaneous order-clearing, we
have a call market where the offers made by buyers and sellers are aggregated to
form their demand and supply functions and all transactions take place at a unique
price (that we choose to be the mid-value of the interval of market-clearing prices).
Under asynchronous order-clearing, we have a continuous double auction where
agents arrive in random order and sequentially submit binding 1 offers on the selling
and buying books. Orders are immediately executed at the outstanding price if they
are marketable; otherwise, they are recorded on the books with the usual price-time
priority and remain valid unless a cancellation occurs. When a transaction takes
place between two traders, their orders are removed from the books and they leave
the market. Hence, orders are cleared asynchronously in separate trades, usually at
different prices.
1 See LiCalzi and Pellizzari [6] on the role of an assumption of binding offers.
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Agents from a pool of N traders interact repeatedly and anonymously. In each
round, we randomly draw (without replacement) b buyers and s sellers from the
pool of available agents and let them visit the market (b+ s = n" N). Hence, the
agents active in the market during a specific round change randomly over time. This
increases variety and learning opportunities.
We constrain traders to make offers that are individually rational: no buyer
can bid more than his valuation and no seller can ask less than her cost. We
evolve traders’ strategies using genetic programming, henceforth nicknamed GP
for brevity. This optimization method is an alternative approach to the genetic al-
gorithm used in Fano et al. [2]. The design of our GP routines follows closely the
standard tree-based approach described in Koza [4]. Evolution takes place sequen-
tially over at least 2500 optimization steps.2 In each step, one trader is randomly
selected from the pool and his trading function is optimized by GP. As the complex-
ity of the optimization problem is rather low, we choose conservative parameters for
the GP algorithm.
An initial population of 100 trading strategies is generated by the ramped-half-
half method with a maximum number of 100 nodes. Input data for a strategy is v or
c, as well as a set of constants (0.01, 0.1, 2, 3, 7). To modify the input data, GP can
refer to a set of standard arithmetic functions (+,−,×,÷,exp, ln). The initial pop-
ulation of strategies is improved by an evolutionary process over 50 generations.
To generate a member of a new generation, GP selects successful strategies from
the previous generation based on a tournament of size 4 and applies crossover and
mutation with probability 0.8 and 0.2, respectively. The fitness function is the av-
erage profit of a strategy over 30 rounds. The best strategy from the last generation
is selected and the trader stays with it until he is chosen for a further optimization
step.
We report results over a fixed experimental design with nine cells, where buyers
are on the longer side of the market. Each cell corresponds to a different traders’
population, where the number of sellers is equal to s = 1, s = 5, and s = 50, against
a number of buyers equal to b = s, b = 3s, and b = 5s. We usually arrange the
nine cells in a 3× 3 matrix, where the columns correspond to s = 1 (left), s = 5
(center) and s = 50 (right), and the rows to b = s buyers (top), b = 3s (middle), and
b = 5s (bottom). In each experiment, the pool of agents learns to trade using the GP
as described above. At the end of the learning process, for each cell we calculate
results over 1000 additional rounds of trading.
3 Convergence to the Competitive Outcome
The competitive price obtains under simultaneous order-clearing when all agents
truthfully report their costs and their valuations. We denote this by S-TT for brevity.
2 We go up to 6000 steps for large markets with many agents.
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(The rest of our shorthand notation is “A” for the asynchronous order-clearing rule
and “GP” for the trading strategies developed by genetic programming.)
Generally speaking, we find that the trading price rapidly stabilizes around the
competitive price both for S-GP and A-GP. This convergence is faster under S-GP.
To exemplify, we compare in Figure 1 the average trading price (in black) and its
standard deviation (in grey) for the case s = 50 and b = 5s as a function of the
optimization steps. (The statistics are computed over 1000 rounds of trading while
freezing the GP process.) It is apparent that, compared to S-GP, it takes more time
under A-GP before enough learning takes place to stabilize prices.
Fig. 1 Average price (black) and standard deviation (grey) under simultaneous (left) and asyn-
chronous (right) order clearing for the case s = 50 and b = 5s.
More detailed information appears in Table 1, where for each cell we report in
the first line the (average) competitive equilibrium price computed using S-TT (left)
and the average trading price under S-GP (center). The second line in each cell gives
the average trading price under A-TT (left) and A-GP (center). To control for the
accumulation of orders in the book, we also give the average closing price on the
right of the second line in each cell, using data from the last transaction in each
round. Averages are taken over all the transactions from 1000 rounds per at least 10
distinct simulations with different random seeds.
s = 1 s = 5 s = 50
b = s 0.498 0.496 0.501 0.501 0.500 0.499
0.495 0.494 0.494 0.503 0.500 0.499 0.500 0.500 0.500
b = 3s 0.601 0.698 0.690 0.723 0.746 0.748
0.638 0.630 0.630 0.735 0.705 0.710 0.807 0.744 0.745
b = 5s 0.647 0.774 0.763 0.806 0.829 0.831
0.716 0.703 0.703 0.818 0.789 0.794 0.882 0.829 0.830
Table 1 Each cell exhibits the average transaction price for S-TT (top left), S-GP (top center),
A-TT (bottom left), A-GP (bottom center), as well as the average closing price for A-GP (bottom
right).
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The close alignment of the values in the cells of the first line (where b = s and
s= 1,5,50 as we move rightward) confirms the result in Fano et al. [2]: in a balanced
market, the evolution of trading strategies stabilizes prices around the competitive
price p∗, particularly when the market grows large. On the other hand, the second
and third horizontal lines (with b = 3s and b = 5s, respectively) show a mismatch
between the price under the baseline case of S-TT (top-left) and the prices under
S-GP or A-GP in the central column of the four cells with s = 1 or s = 5 in the
bottom-left corner. This mismatch is supported for any practical level of confidence
by a two-sided paired t-test. (By a practical level of confidence we mean a p-value
lower than 10−5.)
We conclude that there is no convergence of the realized prices to the competitive
price p∗ under price-taking behavior when the market is unbalanced (b = 3s,5s)
and the market size is not large (s = 1,5). When the market is relatively small, the
disadvantage borne by the long side turns out to lead to prices higher than p ∗ under
either simultaneous or asynchronous order-clearing. This effect is novel with respect
to what is reported by Fano et al. [2] under the assumption of balanced markets.
A careful examination of Table 1 reveals a second novel effect. Comparing the
two prices in the central column of each cell for the six unbalanced markets, we
find that the average transaction price under S-GP is systematically higher than the
average transaction price under A-GP. For five of the six cells, this difference is
statistically significant for any practical level of confidence based on a two-sided
paired t-test. (The exception is the case s = 50,b = 3s where we find a p-value of
0.004.) In other words, when we take into account that agents try and optimize their
trading strategies with respect to the protocol in use, the long side of the market
finds the asynchronous order-clearing rule more beneficial.
We come back to this issue in the next sections, but the main intuition is the
following. The simultaneous order-clearing forces a uniform price for all traders
on the long side, while the asynchronous rule allows different agents to trade at
different prices. When both sides of the market optimize their strategies, no one on
the long side can earn any advantage under a uniform price. On the other hand, the
price dispersion allowed by the asynchronous rule can be put at use to mitigate the
disadvantage borne by traders on the long side.
Contrast this with the case where we assume that agents stick to TT trading.
Comparing values across the first column in each cell of the six unbalanced mar-
kets, we see that simultaneous order-clearing is preferred by the long side. When
all agents trade truthfully, asynchronous order-clearing puts the long side at a dis-
advantage because it increases the competitive pressure each buyer must bear; see
Gjerstad [3].
Clearly, the strategic behavior of traders interacts differently with the order-
clearing rule when we move from TT to GP. Comparing S-TT and S-GP in the
first row of each cell of the unbalanced markets, we see that under simultaneous
order-clearing trading based on optimized strategies puts the long side to a disad-
vantage. On the other hand, comparing A-TT and A-GP in the second row of each
cell of the unbalanced markets, we find that asynchronous order-clearing improves
the terms of trade for the long side.
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Finally, we note that, under both GP and TT, the difference between the average
trading price under both the S or the A treatment shrinks as the size of the market
grows: expanding the market size swamps the differences in prices because it in-
creases competition among traders on the same side and thus reduces the strategic
advantage that either leg of the market may hold.
4 The Evolution of Strategic Behavior
We report the outcome of our simulations about the evolution of strategic behavior
in two distinct sections. The first one deals with simultaneous order-clearing. The
second one discusses the asynchronous case.
4.1 Simultaneous Order Clearing
Figure 2 reports in black the average trading functions evolved by GP for the nine
cells in our experimental design, as well as a sample of the actual trading functions
in grey. The horizontal dashed lines denote the average theoretical price (grey), and
the average price over all trades (black).
Given our assumption of individual rationality, buyers’ functions lie in the lower
triangle below the diagonal and sellers’ functions in the upper triangle. For visual
clarity and computational speed, we assume that an extramarginal agent picks truth-
telling over another strategy whenever both options are optimal; e.g., since none of
the individually rational bids from a buyer with valuation v < 0.25 leads to trading,
we let him pick truth-telling. Hence, the initial (final) segment of buyers’ (sellers’)
trading functions is actually on the diagonal.
A comparison of the average trading functions across the first line (where b = s)
confirms the result in Fano et al. [2]: when the size of a balanced market grows, the
marginal agents learn to make an offer equal to their valuation/cost and their trading
strategies approach price-taking. Additional evidence can be gathered by the actual
trading functions depicted in grey. Broadly speaking, their dispersion provides a
visual representation of the level of variety in the learning of individual trading
functions, and thus on the strength of the evolutionary pressure insisting on them.
(Recall that by assumption the dispersion for very weak traders ends up being set to
zero.)
As we move from left to right in the first row, the dispersion around the trading
functions of the marginal traders shrinks to zero: there is a strong evolutionary pres-
sure on all marginal traders to learn price-taking. The residual dispersion in learning
for s = 1 and s = 50 has different explanations. When s = 1, we have a bilateral
monopoly with one buyer and one seller where there is very little selection pressure
due to lack of competition. When s = 50, under simultaneous order-clearing the
uniform price p∗ is set by the marginal traders; once these have learned to be price-
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Fig. 2 Average trading functions under simultaneous order-clearing (solid black). The horizontal
dashed lines denote the average competitive price (grey), and the average price over all trades
(black). Columns are s = 1 (left), s = 5 (center), s = 50 (right); rows are b = s (top), b = 3s
(middle), b = 5s (bottom).
takers, a bid above p∗ or an ask below p∗ is equally profitable for the other traders.
Therefore, the main evolutionary pressure experienced by the intramarginal buyers
(sellers) is to make offers above (below) p∗; accordingly, we see a lot of dispersion
but the intramarginal trading functions never escape such regions. Finally, the only
profitable alternative to offering p∗ is for buyers (sellers) to bid (ask) slightly above
(below) p∗ and extract better terms of trade, although this entails a significant risk
of no trade. So the actual trading functions oscillate between price-taking and an
offer close to p∗.
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Consider now the unbalanced markets in the second and third row. Since b > s,
buyers represent the long side of the market. A comparison of the average trading
functions shows that, when the size of the market grows, the trading strategies con-
verge to price-taking both for the marginal sellers and for a large interval of buyers
around the marginal ones: that is, price-taking behavior spreads from the marginal
traders to most agents on the long side, due to the competitive pressure. Accordingly,
the dispersion of intramarginal buyers’ trading functions shrinks to zero (except for
the strongest ones) while this is not the case for intramarginal sellers. It is apparent
that “traders on the long side of a market wind up holding the short end of the stick”
[8].
4.2 Asynchronous Order Clearing
Figure 3 reports the average trading functions evolved by GP for the nine cells in
our experimental design, using the same format as in Figure 2.
A comparison across the first line (where b = s) confirms the result in Fano et
al. [2]: when the size of a balanced market grows, the intramarginal agents learn to
make a constant offer equal to the competitive price and their trading strategies ap-
proach price-making. The dispersion of trading functions makes it clear that the evo-
lutionary pressure applies to all intramarginal traders. The same observation holds
when markets are unbalanced.
Combining the results about the effects of the order-clearing rule over the evo-
lution of strategic behavior, we can say that two forces are at work. The first one
was pointed out by Fano et al. [2]: the simultaneous rule pushes marginal traders
towards price-taking, while the asynchronous rule attracts intramarginal traders to-
wards price-making. The second novel effect is that, when the market is unbalanced
and order-clearing is simultaneous, the competitive pressure spreads the price-taking
behavior on the long side to all the intramarginal traders.
Different reasons underline these two effects. The first one stems from the asyn-
chronous rule leading to non-uniform prices across trades: this increases the risk
of trading using price-taking, and allows many more learning opportunities to run
away from it. The second effect is due to the increase in competitive pressure among
traders on the long side. As discussed in Sect. 3, a side effect of the asynchronous
rule in allowing better learning is to help traders on the long side of small unbalanced
markets to achieve better terms of trade than under simultaneous order-clearing. A
similar point is made by Pouget [7]), who compares the Walrasian auctioneer trad-
ing protocol against the call auction and finds that in the latter one agents may fail
to learn the competitive equilibrium if they use reinforcement learning.
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Fig. 3 Average trading functions under asynchronous order-clearing (solid black). The horizontal
dashed lines denote the average competitive price (grey), and the average price over all trades
(black). Columns are s = 1 (left), s = 5 (center), s = 50 (right); rows are b = s (top), b = 3s
(middle), b = 5s (bottom).
5 Allocative Efficiency
Our last batch of results concerns allocative efficiency, that we define as the ratio
between the total surplus realized by traders and the theoretical maximum surplus.
(This latter one is computed as the surplus realized under S-TT.) We confirm the
result from Fano et al. [2] that the allocative inefficiency tends to zero as the size of
the market grows regardless of the order-clearing rule, and we find that it holds also
for unbalanced markets.
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Ceteris paribus, the allocative efficiency is higher under the S treatment than un-
der the A treatment for all cells in our experimental design. Moreover, as a function
of the optimization steps, the efficiency remains virtually constant under simultane-
ous order-clearing while it takes several optimization steps before it levels off under
the asynchronous rule. This qualitative difference conforms with our former obser-
vation that the effects of a simultaneous order-clearing rule swamp those associated
with the evolution of trading strategies, while these latter ones carry much greater
impact under the asynchronous rule. To exemplify, Figure 4 depicts the allocative
efficiency (in black) and the buyers’/sellers’ surplus ratio (in grey, to be discussed
below) for the case s = 50 and b = 5s as a function of the optimization steps. (The
statistics are computed over 1000 rounds of trading after freezing the GP process.)
Fig. 4 Efficiency (black) and buyers’/sellers surplus ratio (grey) under simultaneous (left) and
asynchronous (right) order clearing for the case s = 50 and b = 5s.
For a more complete description, we compare the surplus realized under S-GP
and under A-GP. Using the surplus realized under S-TT as benchmark, we look
at the ratios for the realized surplus in the two GP treatments over the benchmark.
Table 2 provides for each cell of our experimental design the average values for such
two quantities, computed over at least 10 distinct simulations. We report the ratio of
surplus for S-GP over S-TT on the left and for A-GP over S-TT on the right. Apart
s = 1 s = 5 s = 50
b = s 0.785 0.797 0.971 0.888 0.996 0.968
b = 3s 0.863 0.824 0.982 0.923 0.998 0.980
b = 5s 0.898 0.854 0.982 0.941 0.998 0.984
Table 2 Average ratios for S-GP vs. S-TT (left) and for A-GP vs. S-TT (right).
from the case where s = b = 1 (for which the distinction between simultaneous and
asynchronous order-clearing is of little consequence), allocative efficiency is higher
under S than under A and grows to 1 as the size of the market increases. This claim
is supported for any practical level of confidence by a two-sided paired t-test. The
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lack of balance among the two sides of the market does not seem to carry discernible
effects, except for the increase in allocative efficiency due to the higher number of
traders available in the unbalanced markets.
Clearly, allocative efficiency is affected both by the protocol and by the trading
strategies adopted by the agents. For instance, since the ratios on the left of each cell
of Table 2 are lower than 1, we can conclude that the strategic behavior developed
under GP reduces the efficiency that could be achieved if everyone would make
truthful offers. Unfortunately, it is well known that the pursuit of individual profits
may hurt the common welfare.
For the case of asynchronous order-clearing,we attempt to disentangle the effects
of protocol and behavior in Table 3 where we report the (average) ratio of surplus
for A-TT over S-TT on the left and for A-GP over A-TT on the right. The ratio
s = 1 s = 5 s = 50
b = s 1.000 0.797 0.807 1.100 0.702 1.379
b = 3s 0.844 0.975 0.825 1.119 0.875 1.119
b = 5s 0.820 1.042 0.864 1.089 0.937 1.050
Table 3 Average ratios for A-TT vs. S-TT (left) and for A-GP vs. A-TT (right).
between A-TT and S-TT measures the loss in allocative efficiency when traders
using truth-telling switch from simultaneous to asynchronous order-clearing. Given
that this latter rule destroys uniform pricing and adds noise due to the random order
of arrival, we expect to see allocative inefficiency.
The second value on the right of each cell gives the (average) ratio between the
surpluses realized under A-GP and A-TT. It measures the improvement in allocative
efficiency brought over by optimizing trading strategies with respect to the protocol.
Since the ratio is greater than 1 in all markets with s %= 1, the pursuit of individual
profits is socially beneficial under asynchronous order-clearing because it reduces
both missed trades and the number of transactions involving extramarginal traders.
Contrasting this with the case of simultaneous order-clearing, we conclude that the
social benefits of strategic behavior may depend on protocolary details.
Our last comparison concerns the ratio between the surplus realized by the long
side and the surplus realized by the short side. This should be (approximately) 1 in a
balanced market and strictly lower than 1 in an unbalanced market. Table 4 reports
the (average) ratio of buyers’ to sellers’ surplus under S-TT on the left, under S-GP
at the center, and under A-GP on the right. As expected, the ratio is close to 1 for
all balanced markets in the first row. Moreover, it is exactly 1 for S-TT with s = 1
because the simultaneous order-clearing rule sets the clearing price exactly midway
between the best bid and the best ask, so the two agents who complete a transaction
must split the surplus equally between themselves.
In all other cases, it is apparent that the buyers on the long side of the mar-
ket capture a share of the allocative efficiency much lower than the sellers on the
short side. Three major effects are worth noting. First, increasing the market size
makes the long side worse off by increasing the competitive pressure among buy-
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s = 1 s = 5 s = 50
b = s 1.000 1.012 1.044 1.001 0.994 0.993 1.000 1.004 1.001
b = 3s 1.000 0.433 0.591 0.542 0.401 0.428 0.347 0.341 0.348
b = 5s 1.000 0.302 0.422 0.413 0.257 0.274 0.212 0.205 0.209
Table 4 Average ratios for buyers’ to sellers’ surplus under S-TT (left), S-GP (center), and A-GP
(right).
ers. Second, compared to the S-TT benchmark, optimizing trading strategies under
simultaneous order-clearing further deteriorates the long side’s position because the
sellers on the short side learn to exploit their relative advantage. Finally, switching
to asynchronous order-clearing under optimized strategies improves the long side’s
performance because the random order of arrival for traders weakens the bargain-
ing position of sellers. These three effects closely match the observations in Sect. 3,
in so far that better terms of trades for the buyers on the long side correspond to
capturing a larger share of the realized surplus.
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